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We study the relation between households’ stock purchases and stock purchases made
by their neighbors. A ten percentage point increase in neighbors’ purchases of stocks
from an industry is associated with a two percentage point increase in households’
own purchases of stocks from that industry. The effect is considerably larger for local
stocks and among households in more social states. Controlling for area sociability,
households’andneighbors’investmentstylepreferences,andtheindustrycomposition
of local ﬁrms, we attribute approximately one-quarter to one-half of the correlation
between households’ stock purchases and stock purchases made by their neighbors to
word-of-mouth communication. (JEL D14, D83, G11)
Although individuals collectively hold about one-half of the U.S. stock
market, information diffusion effects among individual investors—the
relation between the investment choices made by an individual investor’s
neighborhood and the investor’s own investment choices—have received
relatively little attention in the academic literature, probably because of
the lack of detailed data. If present, such effects undoubtedly can affect
individual investors’ asset allocation decisions. Moreover, trades based on
information diffusion might be sufﬁciently correlated and condensed in
time to affect stock prices.
In the domain of institutional investors, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005)
study word-of-mouth effects among mutual fund managers and ﬁnd that
‘‘...a manager is more likely to hold (or buy, or sell) a particular stock
We extend our gratitude to an anonymous discount broker for providing the data on individual investors’
positions, trades, and demographics. Special thanks go to Terry Odean for his help in obtaining and
understanding the data set. Both authors acknowledge the ﬁnancial support from the College Research
BoardattheUniversityof Illinois atUrbana-Champaign.WethankJeanRothof theNBERforassistance
with the 1990 Census data. Finally, we thank seminar participants at the University of Florida and the
University of Illinois for their comments and feedback. The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Address correspondence
to Zoran Ivkovic, Department of Finance, The Eli Broad Graduate School of Management, Michigan
State University, 315 Eppley Center, East Lansing, MI 48824-1121, or e-mail: ivkovich@msu.edu or Scott
Weisbenner, Department of Finance, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 340 Wohlers Hall,
1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820, or e-mail: weisbenn@uiuc.edu.
TheAuthor2007.PublishedbyOxfordUniversityPressonbehalfofTheSocietyforFinancialStudies.All rights
reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm009 Advance Access publication January 29, 2007The Review of Financial Studies / v 20 n 4 2007
in any quarter if other managers in the same city are holding (or buy-
ing, or selling) that same stock.’’ This study complements their work by
ascertaining whether such trading patterns are a broader phenomenon.
For example, individual investors may seek to reduce search costs and
circumvent their lack of expertise by relying on word-of-mouth commu-
nication with those around them. Indeed, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004)
present a model in which stock market participation may be inﬂuenced
by social interaction. Such social interaction can serve as a mechanism
for information exchange via ‘‘word-of-mouth’’ and/or ‘‘observational
learning’’ [Banerjee (1992), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995)]. Duﬂo
and Saez (2002, 2003) present evidence of peer effects in the context of
retirement plans. They ﬁnd that an employee’s participation in retirement
plansandchoiceswithinthoseplansareaffectedbyparticipationdecisions
and choices made by other employees in the same department.
Intheinternationalarena,FengandSeasholes(2004)presentevidenceof
herding effects among individual investors who hold individual brokerage
accounts in the People’s Republic of China. A unique feature of their data
(investors seekingto place trades in personcan doso only in the brokerage
houseinwhichtheyhadopenedtheiraccounts)enablesFengandSeasholes
to disentangle word-of-mouth effects from common reaction to releases of
publicinformation.Theyﬁndthatcommonreactiontopublicinformation
(trades placed across branches in the same region, local to the company),
rather than word-of-mouth effects (trades placed in the same branch),
seems to be a primary determinant of herding in that context.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) ﬁnd that proximity to corporate
headquarters, the language of communication with investors, and the
company’s CEO’s cultural origin are important determinants of Finnish
households’ stock investments. Whereas these ﬁndings could be consistent
with word-of-mouth effects inﬂuencing portfolio choice, they could also
reﬂect households’ tastes for familiarity—preference to invest in compa-
nies that disseminate annual ﬁnancial reports in their native tongues or
feature a CEO with the same origin.
We study information diffusion effects among U.S. individual investors
by using a detailed data set of common-stock investments 35,673 U.S.
households made through a large discount brokerage in the period from
1991 to 1996. Throughout the article, we loosely refer to the correla-
tion between households’ investments and their neighbors’ investments
as ‘‘information diffusion.’’ This term is intended to encapsulate several
potential reasons why such correlation exists—word-of-mouth effects,
similarity in preferences, as well as common local reaction to news. To
further characterize information diffusion and word-of-mouth effects, we
consider state-level measures of sociability and ﬁnd that the level of socia-
bility prevailing in the state to which the household belongs (likely a
strong correlate of the presence of word-of-mouth effects) can explain a
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signiﬁcantportionoftheoveralldiffusioneffect.Moreover,wedisentangle
the diffusion into the inﬂuences of common preferences, structure of the
local industry, and word-of-mouth effects.
Putting our results in perspective and comparing them with the ﬁndings
fromFengandSeasholes(2004)deliversanew,richerunderstandingofthe
different mechanisms that govern individuals’ investment decisions across
various societies. Indeed, whereas Feng and Seasholes (2004) report that
individual investors’ correlated investment decisions are driven by com-
monreactiontolocallyavailablenews,withnoevidenceofword-of-mouth
effectsamongChineseinvestors,ourestimatessuggestthatword-of-mouth
effects among U.S. investors are strong, particularly in more social areas.
Thisdiscrepancyisconsistentwiththedifferencesinthefundamentalchar-
acteristics of the two societies. Freedom House, which has been producing
annual ratings of political and civil rights for more than 200 countries for
the past three decades [Freedom House (2004)], has ranked the United
States among the highest and the People’s Republic of China among
the lowest along the dimension of civil liberties. An essential ingredient
of the civil liberties score is prevalence of open and free discussion (or
absence thereof). Coupled with the fact that many, if not most, companies
in the People’s Republic of China are at least partly government-owned,
it is very plausible that exchanging investment-relevant information in a
society deprived of open and free discussion and many other civil liberties
is rare and modest.
Evenwithin theUnitedStatesthereisvariationin sociability(e.g.,mem-
bership in clubs, trust in other people). If word-of-mouth is an important
contributor to households’ stock purchases, the observed correlation in a
household’sportfolio allocation and that of its neighbors should be higher
in the more social areas. Other explanations for information diffusion
effects, such as correlated preferences and common local reaction to news,
should not vary with the sociability of the community. Using state-level
variation in sociability measures enables us to differentiate among the
competing hypotheses that can explain trading patterns of U.S. investors.
Overall, we ﬁnd a strong information diffusion effect (‘‘neighborhood
effect’’): a ten percentage point increase in purchases of stocks from an
industry made by a household’s neighbors is associated with an increase
of two percentage points in the household’s own purchases of stocks from
that industry. We pay particular attention to the differentiation between
information diffusion effects related to local stocks (deﬁned as companies
headquartered within 50 miles from the household) and the effects related
to nonlocal stocks. Whereas the key neighborhood effects—similarity in
preferences, the impact of the structure of the local industry, and word-
of-mouth—can prevail among the investments both local and nonlocal to
the household, most of those effects will likely be far more pronounced
among local investments because, as demonstrated for both professional
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money managers [Coval and Moskowitz (2001)] and individual investors
[Ivkovi´ c and Weisbenner (2005)], the ﬂow of value-relevant information
regarding local companies appears to be higher and of better quality than
the comparable ﬂow regarding remote, nonlocal companies.
Not surprisingly, we indeed ﬁnd that information diffusion effects
are considerably stronger for local purchases than for nonlocal ones. For
example,iftheneighborhood’sallocationoflocalpurchasestoaparticular
industry increases by ten percentage points, a household tends to increase
its own allocation of local purchases to the industry by a comparable
amount. This result adds another dimension to the already documented
high degrees of individual investors’ locality, both in the United States
[Ivkovi´ c and Weisbenner (2005), Zhu (2002)] and abroad [Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001), Massa and Simonov (2006)]: not only do investors tend
disproportionately to invest locally, but there are also strong information
diffusion effects in their neighborhood.
We further ﬁnd that a household’s sensitivity to neighbors’ investment
choices increases with the population of the household’s community. Such
diffusion in stock trading affects individual investors’ asset allocation
decisions. For example, although residents in larger metropolitan areas
have substantially more diverse investment opportunities and tend to
invest more in local stocks, we ﬁnd that their local stock investments tend
to remain just as concentratedas those madeby residents of less populated
communities (who have a signiﬁcantly smaller pool of potential local
investments). This tendency is consistent with the notion that residents
in more populous geographic areas might be exposed to word-of-mouth
effects to a higher degree than residents in less highly populated areas.
Finally, to disentangle the contributions of correlated preferences and
the structure of the local economy to the observed correlation between
individual investors’ stock purchases and those of their neighbors from
‘‘word-of-mouth’’effects,weconducttwo tests.First,weconsiderthelevel
of sociability of the state to which the household belongs and ﬁnd that the
relation between industry-level household purchases and neighborhood
purchases is substantially stronger among householdsin the more sociable
states. Second, we consider the households’ own preferences (as revealed
by the composition of their respective portfolios across industries at
the beginning of each quarter), preferences of the households’ respective
neighborhoods (as revealed by the composition of the neighborhoods’
aggregateportfolios),aswellasthecompositionoflocalﬁrmsandworkers
by industry. We ﬁnd that one-quarter to one-half of the overall diffusion
effect among both local and nonlocal investments cannot be attributed
to these sources. We regard the remaining portions of the diffusion
effect as a conservative lower bound on the impact of word-of-mouth
communication effects on household trading decisions. Disentangling the
overall information diffusion effect into word-of mouth communication
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and other diffusion effects potentially yields further insight as to how
correlated trading among individuals may inﬂuence stock prices.
Our results complement and extend those of Hong, Kubik, and Stein
(2005), suggesting that word-of-mouth effects are a broad phenomenon
that affects ﬁnancial decisions made by both mutual fund managers
and individual investors. The two studies provide evidence supportive of
word-of-mouth effects using different techniques, thereby adding to the
robustness of the overall ﬁnding. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) rule
out alternative explanations for correlated trading patterns by examining
trading activity before and after Regulation FD and by focusing on trades
in stocks for which investor relations are unlikely to be a contributing
factor (stocks not local to the managers and small stocks). In this article,
we disentangle possible explanations for correlated trading patterns by
exploiting differences in sociability of communities across the United
States as well as introducing several controls for similarity in investment
preferences within the community (as manifested by previous household
investment decisions) and the composition of the local economy.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 1 describes
the data and summary statistics. We present our basic ﬁndings concerning
information diffusion, the impact of the size of the population residing
in the household’s community, and dissipation of diffusion effects with
distancefromthehouseholdinSection 2.Weexaminetheroleofsociability
andidentifythecontributionsofcorrelatedpreferences,thestructureofthe
local economy, and word-of-mouth communication to overall diffusion in
individuals’ investment choices in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
1. Data and Descriptive Statistics
1.1 Data
The primary data set, obtained from a large discount broker, consists of
individual investors’ monthly positions and trades over a 6-year period
from 1991 to 1996. It covers the investments that 78,000 households made
through the discount broker, including common stocks, mutual funds,
and other securities. Each household could have as few as 1 and as
many as 21 accounts (the median number of accounts per household is
2). The information associated with each trade includes the account in
which the trade was made. A separate data ﬁle contains the information
associatedwitheachaccount,includingthehouseholdtowhichtheaccount
belongs. This structure of the data allows us to associate with each trade
the household that made it. For further details see Barber and Odean
(2000).
In this article we focus on the common stocks traded on the NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq exchanges. Common stock investments constitute
roughlythree-quartersofthetotalvalueofhouseholdinvestmentsthrough
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the brokerage house in the sample. We use the Center for Research in
SecurityPrices(CRSP)databasetoobtaininformationonstockpricesand
returnsandCOMPUSTATtoobtainseveralﬁrmcharacteristics,including
company headquarters location (identiﬁed by its state and county codes).
We use the headquarters location as opposed to the state of incorporation
because ﬁrms often do not have most of their operations in their state of
incorporation.1
We exclude the stocks that we could not match with CRSP and
COMPUSTAT; they were most likely listed on smaller exchanges. We
also exclude stocks not headquartered in the continental United States.
The resulting ‘‘market’’—the universe of stocks about which we could
obtain the necessary characteristics and information—is representative of
the overall market. For example, at the end of 1991 the ‘‘market’’ consists
of 5,478 stocks that cover 89% of the overall market capitalization at the
time.
The sample of households used in this study is a subset of the entire
collection of households for which we could ascertain their zip code and
thus determine their location. We obtain the latitude and longitude for
eachofthezipcodesfromtheGazetteerPlaceandZipCodeDatabase[U.S.
CensusBureau(1990)].CompanylocationscomefromtheCOMPUSTAT
AnnualResearchFiles,whichcontaintheinformationregardingcompany
headquarters’county codes.Finally, we identify the latitude and longitude
for each county from the Gazetteer Place and Zip Code Database [U.S.
CensusBureau(1990)]aswell.Weusethestandardformulaforcomputing
thedistanced(a,b)instatutorymilesbetweentwopointsaandbasfollows:
d(a,b) = arccos{cos(a1)cos(a2)cos(b1)cos(b2) + cos(a1)
sin(a2)cos(b1)sin(b2) + sin(a1)sin(b1)}r (1)
where a1 and b1 (a2 and b2) are the latitudes (longitudes) of the two points
(expressed in radians), respectively, and r denotes the radius of the Earth
(approximately 3,963 statutory miles).
The sample size necessitates two adjustments. First, instead of
ﬁtting regressions on the basis of individual stocks, we aggregate
all the buys in each quarter by assigning ﬁrms to one of the
following 14 industry groups on the basis of their SIC (Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation) codes: mining, oil and gas, construction, food,
basic materials, medical/biotechnology, manufacturing, transportation,
telecommunications, utilities, retail/wholesale trade, ﬁnance, technology,
and services. Moreover, although 35,673 households purchased common
1 Whereas this is a somewhat imprecise measure, to our knowledge the data that detail the geographic
distribution ofemployees foreachcompanyarenot available. Moreover,mostvalue-relevant, strategically
important information is likely concentrated at the company headquarters.
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stocks at some point duringthe sample period,in each quarter we consider
only the householdsthat madesome purchasesduring the quarter.In sum,
there are 23 complete quarters in the sample period (1991:1 to 1996:3),
14 industries, and 7,000 to 9000 households that made stock purchases
in a quarter. This leads to a total of 2,678,004 observations, where each
observation has several control variables, as well as 322 industry-quarter
dummy variables (14 industries × 23 quarters).
In most analyses, we relate the industry composition of a household’s
purchasesduringaquartertotheindustrycompositionofallthepurchases
of the household’s neighbors (households located within 50 miles) made
during the quarter, plus appropriate controls. We choose this distance
because there is evidence that 50 miles captures most of one’s social
interactions.2
Finally, in some analyses we relate the extent of information diffusion
to the sociability that prevails in the area surrounding the household. To
capture sociability, we use state-level values of the Comprehensive Social
Capital Index, as collected and presented in Putnam (2000).3 We classify
households according to their state’s Comprehensive Social Capital Index
and split the sample of households into sociable and nonsociable ones,
where the breakpoint is the sociability measure of the median household
in the sample.4
1.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 summarizes quarterly household stock purchases at the industry
level. Summary statistics are reported annually, as well as for the entire
sample period (bottom row of the table). The ﬁrst column presents the
number of household-quarter-industry (h,t,i) combinations in a given
year such that household h made at least one purchase in quarter t in
industry i. The second column tallies the number of distinct households
appearing in the sample in a given year. The third column lists average
dollar values of households’ quarterly purchases, where median values
are reported in parentheses underneath the mean values. The last column
breaksdownthepurchasesaccordingtotheirdistancesfromthehousehold
(i.e., whether the ﬁrm headquarters is located within 50 miles of the
2 For example, according to the 1990 Census, 88% of the population lives within 25 miles of work (98% live
within 50 miles). Moreover, if two co-workers each live only 25 miles from work, they may live as many
as 50 miles apart.
3 Robert D. Putnam’s ‘‘Bowling Alone’’ (2000) features 14 state-level measures of social capital, such
as time spent visiting friends, number of organizations per capita, number of group memberships, and
trust in people, along with the speciﬁc measure we use in the article, the Comprehensive Social Capital
Index. Details are described in their book (see Table 4 and pp. 290–291). The data are available from
http://www.bowlingalone.com/data.php3.
4 To date, researchers have employed a few different sociability measures. For example, in their study of
the relation between social interaction and stock market participation, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) use
church attendance as a proxy for sociability.
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Table 1
Quarterly purchases of stock by households
Mean quarterly purchase
# Purchases # Distinct HHs (in $) [median] Local (%)
1991 36,250 20,366 23,242 [7,113] 16.4
1992 36,270 20,300 23,576 [7,500] 17.0
1993 34,377 18,894 25,150 [7,500] 16.4
1994 28,726 16,307 25,418 [7,388] 17.4
1995 30,299 16,134 38,540 [9,313] 17.8
1996 (Q1–Q3) 25,364 15,483 42,277 [9,725] 17.5
TOTAL 191,286 35,673 28,922 [7 949] 17.1
This table summarizes quarterly household stock purchases at the industry level. Summary
statistics are reportedannually from 1991 to 1996, as well as for the entiresample period (bottom
row of the table). The ﬁrst column presents the number of household, quarter, industry (h,t,i)
combinations in a given year such that household h made at least one purchase in quarter t in
industry i. The second column tallies the number of distinct households appearing in the sample
in a given year. The third column lists average dollar values of households’ quarterly purchases,
where median values are reported in parentheses directly underneath the mean values. The last
column breaks down the purchases according to their distance from the household (i.e., whether
the ﬁrm headquarters is located within 50 miles of the household).
household).Thereareatotalof191,286‘‘purchases’’—household-quarter-
industry(h,t,i)combinationsforwhichtherewasapurchasebyhousehold
h in quarter t in industry i—with 16,000–20,000 households making
purchases each year, for a total of 35,673 distinct households throughout
the sample period. The distribution of the dollar values of quarterly
purchases is skewed; whereas the mean quarterly purchase was around
$29,000, the median value was substantially smaller, around $8,000. The
fourth column shows individual investors’ disproportionate preference for
local stocks (17.1% of all purchases), a phenomenon studied in Ivkovi´ c
and Weisbenner (2005) and Zhu (2002).
2. Information Diffusion Effects
2.1 Basic regression speciﬁcation
We begin by classifying individual stock purchases made by household
h in quarter t into industries i = 1,2,... , 14 and compute fh,t,i,t h e
dollar-weighted share of a household’s quarterly buys in each industry.5
In various analyses, the aggregation into 14 industries is done across
all stock purchases, local purchases only, and nonlocal purchases only.
Moreover, for each household h and each quarter t we also compute
F50
−h,t,i,i= 1,2,... , 14, that is, the proportion of buys made by all
neighboring households within 50 miles from household h (excluding
household h) in each of the 14 industries. For presentational convenience,
throughout the article the household industry shares fh,t,i are expressed in
percentagepoints(thatis,theyaremultipliedby100),whereasneighboring
5 Note that, by construction, for every h and every t, i=1,...,14 fh,t,I = 100.
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household industry shares are not. Finally, we employ industry-quarter
effects to allow for marketwide variation in demand across industries and
time by deﬁning 322 dummy variables Dt,i,t= 1,..., 23 (from quarter
1991:1 to 1996:3), and i = 1,2,..., 14. These controls ensure that our
results are not driven by, for example, technology stocks beating analysts’
expectations, which belong to the common information set that may
affect buying patterns of all investors, but rather reﬂect the differences
in households’ propensity to purchase technology stocks across different
communities. In sum, the basic regression is:
fh,t,i = βF 50
−h,t,i +
23 
t=1
14 
i=1
γ t,iDt,i+ εh,t,i (2)
For the basic speciﬁcation without controls other than the 322 dummy
variables, the null hypothesis is that information diffusion effects
(‘‘neighborhood effects’’) do not exist, that is, that the coefﬁcient β is
zero. A positive β would suggest the presence of information diffusion
effects.
Wenextaddressthecorrelationstructureoftheerrorterm:observations
are independent neither within each household-quarter combination
(industry shares necessarily need to add up to one) nor across time
(households’ preferences are unlikely to change at quarterly frequency).
It follows that the OLS regression estimation, although consistent, would
produce biased standard errors. Thus, we report the standard errors and
resulting tests of statistical signiﬁcance on the basis of a robust estimator
thatclustersobservationsatthehousehold-quarterlevelforallregressions.
There are several reasons why U.S. individuals’ investment choices
might be related to those made by their neighbors. At the outset, we note
that individual investors might be reacting to the same publicly available
information to which their neighbors are reacting. Such tendencies may
causecorrelatedtrading.Indeed,Barber,Odean,andZhu(2006)document
thattradingpatternsarecorrelatedacrossindividualinvestors,andBarber
and Odean (2005) ﬁnd that individual investors are inclined to buy
stocks that have attracted attention. These correlated trading patterns
are not necessarily surprising in light of exposure to (the same) publicly
available information, as well as to the pronounced presence of the
disposition effect [Odean (1998)], tax-motivated trading [Ivkovi´ c, Poterba,
andWeisbenner(2005)],orotherbehavioralphenomenathatmightprevail
amongindividualinvestors,yetneednotbedrivenbyinformationdiffusion
effects. Our basic set of 322 industry-quarter dummy variables seeks to
control for these and other trading factors that do not vary across
communities (e.g., when a stock price reaches an all-time high, it does
so for all investors) and thereby to allow our speciﬁcations to pick up
information diffusion effects.
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2.2 Information diffusion effects for purchases
We present the results of ﬁtting the regression from Equation (2) in Panel
A of Table 2. Within the panel, each row pertains to a different dependent
variable.Theﬁrstrowofthepanelpertainstotheindustrysharebreakdown
fh,t,i computed across all buys. Running the basic regression, without
any controls other than the 322 industry-quarter dummies, produces the
highly statistically signiﬁcant estimate of 20.7 and thus suggests that a
10 percentage point change in the neighbors’ allocation of purchases in
an industry is associated with a nearly 2.1 percentage point change in the
household’s own allocation of purchases in the industry.6
As discussed in the introduction, information diffusion that prevails
amonglocalandnonlocalstocksmaybedifferent.Similarityinpreferences,
the structure of the local industry, and word-of-mouth effects are likely
strongeramonglocalinvestments.Thisinquiryisalsomotivatedbystudies
of local bias among both institutional investors Coval and Moskowitz
(1999) and individual investors [Ivkovi´ c and Weisbenner (2005) and Zhu
(2002)]. These studies ﬁnd that both groups of investors are biased toward
holdingdisproportionatelymorelocalstocksintheirportfolios.Moreover,
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Ivkovi´ c and Weisbenner (2005) present
evidencethatlocalinvestmentsoutperformednonlocalonesamongmutual
fund managers and individual investors, respectively.
Separate consideration of local purchases7 and nonlocal purchases,
reported in the next two rows of Table 2, Panel A, indeed reveals that local
information diffusion effects are larger than the nonlocal ones by an order
ofmagnitude(119.3vs.8.4).Forexample,iftheneighborhood’sallocation
of purchases to a particular industry increases by ten percentage points,
a household tends to increase its own allocation of local purchases to the
industry by a comparable amount. This result adds another dimension
to the already documented high degrees of individual investors’ locality,
both in the UnitedStates [Ivkovi´ cand Weisbenner(2005), Zhu (2002)] and
overseas [Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Massa and Simonov (2006)] by
suggesting the possibility that strong information diffusion effects could
contribute to individual investors’ local bias.
2.3 Information diffusion effects for sales and positions
In Panels B and C of Table 2 we also examine the extent to which
households’ sale and holding decisions are correlated with those of their
6 If regressions are estimated for each quarter separately, in which case each quarterly regression only has
14 dummy variables for the industry effects, the estimated coefﬁcient β is highly statistically signiﬁcant
in all twenty-three regressions. Quarterly regressions suggest that information diffusion effects are strong
throughout the sample period, with point estimates ranging from 13.6 to 28.3 across the 23 quarters.
7 In the regressions for local buys we discarded all the h,t,i observations for which there were no ﬁrms
in industry i within 50 miles from household h in quarter t because household h simply could not have
invested into industry i locally.
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Table 2
Information diffusion for purchases, sales, and positions
Composition of HH
variable ≤ 50 miles R2 #O b s .
Panel A: Purchases
All buys 20.7 (0.3)*** 0.142 2,678,004
Local buys (within 50 miles) 119.3 (1.2)*** 0.232 568,247
Nonlocal Buys (outside 50 miles) 8.4 (0.3)*** 0.129 2,337,314
Panel B: Sales
All sells 30.0 (0.3)*** 0.123 2,448,838
Local sells (within 50 miles) 122.4 (1.2)*** 0.248 526,273
Nonlocal sells (outside 50 miles) 6.5 (0.3)*** 0.104 2,115,722
Panel C: Positions
All positions 36.5 (0.3)*** 0.087 8,359,442
Local positions (within 50 miles) 153.4 (0.7)*** 0.143 2,429,728
Nonlocal positions (outside 50 miles) 17.7 (0.3)*** 0.072 7,449,582
This table presents the results of ﬁtting the basic information diffusion regression
from Equation (2) over the 23 quarters from January of 1991 to October 1996 :
fh,t,i = βF 50
−h,t,i +
23 
t=1
14 
i=1
γt,iDt,i+ εh,t,i.
Panel A reports regression results relating the composition of households’ stock
purchases across 14 broad industry groups to the composition of their communities’
purchases (the community is deﬁned as all other households within 50 miles).
Analogously, Panels B and C present regression results for the composition of
sales and positions, respectively. Regressions in all three panels are estimated on
subsamples identiﬁed by the distance from households to company headquarters
(All, Local, and Nonlocal). Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for
heteroskedasticity, as well as correlation of error terms at the household-quarter
level.
***,**,* denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
neighbors. We ﬁnd a similar pattern of results for sale decisions as we do
for purchasedecisions.For example,estimates from Panel B suggest that a
ten percentage point change in the neighbors’ sales of stock in an industry
is associated with a three percentage point change in the household’s own
sales of stock in the industry.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the correlation between the composition of
a household’s positions across industries and that of their neighbors is
substantially larger than those for purchases (the coefﬁcients are larger
in magnitude by 50% to 100% across the three samples). This larger
correlation reﬂects the fact that positions are the combination of both
past purchase decisions and the returns accrued on those investments.
The larger correlation for positions relative to trades mirrors the results
reported for mutual fund managers in Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005).
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For the remainder of the article, we focus on households’ purchase
decisions because they are unconstrained, that is, households are free
to purchase any stock, and they represent households’ active ﬁnancial
decisions. By contrast, in the absence of short selling, sale decisions are
limited to the stocks already held (essentially no investors in our sample
sold stocks short). Thus, a correlation in selling activity could simply
represent an underlying correlation in the original buying activity of those
stocks. Moreover, a correlation in positions could in part simply reﬂect
households’ inertia, as households could hold similar stocks over a long
periodof time (and thusexperiencesimilar movementsinthe value of their
portfolio positions).8
2.4 Information diffusion effects and local population size
In this section, we stratify households according to the size of the
populationthatresideswithin50milesfromthehousehold.Wedeﬁnefour
categories: 0–1 million residents, 1–2.5 million residents, 2.5–5 million
residents,andmorethan5millionresidents.Notsurprisingly,thesizeofthe
local population and the diversity of local companies are positively related
(i.e., local population and the Herﬁndahl index of industry concentration
arenegativelycorrelated).Speciﬁcally,theHerﬁndahlindexoftheindustry
compositionofﬁrmslocaltotheaveragehouseholddecreasesfromaround
0.5 to around 0.2 as the population increases from 0–1 million local
residentsto morethan 5 million localresidents.9 Yet, although the average
dollar amount of quarterly purchases of local individual stocks increases
from $13,000 to $22,400 as the size of the local population increases
from 0–1 million to more than 5 million local residents, the Herﬁndahl
index of households’ local purchases across industries remains virtually
unchanged—it drops only very slightly from 0.99 to 0.95. Thus, although
residents in larger metropolitan areas have substantially more diverse
investment opportunities and tend to invest more into local stocks, they
tend to remain very focused in their industry allocation. This tendency
is consistent with the notion that residents in more populous geographic
areas might be exposed to information diffusion effects to a higher degree
than residents in less highly populated areas. To conﬁrm this intuition,
we run a simple modiﬁcation of the basic regression from Equation (2)
on subsamples selected by the type of purchase (all buys, local buys,
and nonlocal buys), wherein information diffusion effects are interacted
with indicator variables representing local population size (0–1 million,
1–2.5million,2.5–5million,morethan5million).Thecoefﬁcientestimate
8 In unreported analyses, we have veriﬁed that conclusions drawn for the subsequent analyses in the article
regarding households’ purchase decisions hold for sales and holdings as well (results available upon
request).
9 Firms are divided into 14 industry groups. Thus, a community with equal representation across all
industries would have a local ﬁrm Herﬁndahl index of 0.07.
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presentedinthetableforaparticularpopulationgrouprepresentsthetotal
information diffusion effect for that group (i.e., the sum of the diffusion
effectforthe0–1milliongroupand theinteractiontermforthatparticular
population group).
Across all three regressions presented in Table 3, information diffusion
effects in purchasesincreasewith populationsize. Strongereffects in larger
metropolitan areas may stem from a greater ﬂow of investment-relevant
information through increased availability of information sources (e.g.,
business-orientedmagazinesandnewspapers)andadvertisingefforts,both
ofwhicharesubjecttoeconomiesofscaleandaretypicallymoresubstantial
in larger metropolitan areas.
2.5 Dissipation of information diffusion effects with distance from the
household
One would expect information diffusion effects to dissipate as the dis-
tance from the household increases. To test this hypothesis, we deﬁne
regions surrounding the household at increasingly larger distances as fol-
lows: 0–50 miles, 50–70.7 miles, 70.7–86.6 miles, 86.6–100 miles, ... ,
141.4–150 miles. These regions each cover a geographic area of the same
size (502π = 7,854 square miles). We then run a regression similar to
Equation (2), except, instead of having one information diffusion regres-
sor F50
−h,t,i, the speciﬁcation now has nine (F50
−h,t,i,F50–71
h,t,i ,F71–87
h,t,i ,F87–100
h,t,i ,
F100–112
h,t,i ,F112–122
h,t,i ,F122–132
h,t,i ,F132–141
h,t,i ,a n dF141–150
h,t,i ). The results are pre-
sented graphically in Figure 1. Across all three panels, that is, for all buys,
local buys, and non-local buys, the pattern is the same: there is a rapid and
fairly steady exponential decline of the information diffusion coefﬁcients
with distance from the household. As one might suspect, a household’s
purchases of non-local stocks are relatively more sensitive to the decisions
made by members of more distant communities than its purchases of
local stocks are. That is, going beyond the 50-mile community leads to a
substantially faster decline in information diffusion effects in the domain
of local stocks than in the domain of non-local stocks.
The Figure illustrates dissipation of information diffusion effects with
distance from the household. Regions surrounding the household at
increasinglylargerdistanceshavethesamegeographicarea(502π = 7,854
square miles). The regression speciﬁcation is similar to Equation (2),
except, instead of having one information diffusion regressor, the
speciﬁcation now has nine—one for each geographic area
2.6 Robustness checks
An issue of potential concern for local information diffusion is that the
effect might be driven by some form of inside trading: those who work
for a company may be trading in their own company stock and may
be selectively releasing pertinent information to their relatives and close
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Dissipation of information diffusion.
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friends. We regard this effect as somewhat distinct from the other aspects
of information diffusion because the information the investors would
receive is likely much more precise than the information available through
word-of-mouth effects, exposure to local news, inﬂuence of company’s
presence through advertising efforts, company-sponsoredevents, or social
interaction with company employees.
Unfortunately, the data set does not provide information about the
investors’ current and past employers. We control for the own-company
stock explanation, however, by focusing on the plausible assumption
Table 3
Information diffusion for purchases with population interactions
Composition of HH
buys ≤ 50 miles R2 #O b s .
All Buys
Population in millions
0–1 5.2 (0.4)*** 0.147 2,678,004
1–2.5 10.7 (0.8)***
2.5–5 27.2 (1.0)***
5+ 53.5 (0.9)***
Local buys
Population in millions
0–1 64.2 (4.9)*** 0.245 568,247
1–2.5 59.0 (3.0)***
2.5–5 102.7 (2.3)***
5+ 139.5 (1.6)***
Nonlocal buys
Population in millions
0–1 4.5 (0.4)*** 0.129 2,337,314
1–2.5 6.5 (0.8)***
2.5–5 9.3 (1.1)***
5+ 13.1 (1.0)***
This table presents the results of ﬁtting a diffusion regression
for purchases, a variant of Equation (2) that distinguishes among
households according to the size of the population that resides
within 50 miles of them into four categories and assesses information
diffusion effects in neighborhoods of various sizes:
fh,t,i =

βF 50
−h,t,i

∗ Population Interactions
+

23 
t=1
14 
i=1
γt,iDt,i

∗ Population Interactions + εh,t,i.
The four categories are: 0–1 million, 1–2.5 million, 2.5–5 million,
and more than 5 million residents. Regressions are estimated on
subsamples identiﬁed by the type of purchase (All Buys, Local
Buys, and Nonlocal Buys). The coefﬁcient estimates for a particular
population group represents the overall information diffusion effect
for that group (i.e., the sum of the diffusion effect for the 0–1 million
groupandtheinteractiontermforthatparticular population group).
Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for heteroskedasticity,
as well as correlation of error terms at the household-quarter level.
***,**,* denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
1341The Review of Financial Studies / v 20 n 4 2007
that, if a household’s local purchase is motivated by inside information,
it is likely to be the household’s largest local trade in that quarter.
Accordingly, we compute for each household h in quarter t the industry
composition of local purchases excluding the single largest stock purchase
made by householdh in quarter t. In unreportedanalyses, we ﬁnd that this
speciﬁcation yields estimates of the local information diffusion effect that
are even somewhat larger than the estimates based on the full sample of
local investments (152.5 vs. 119.3). Therefore, we do not ﬁnd evidence that
trading in own-company stock drives the estimated information diffusion
effects among local investments.
Another issue of potential concern is that the estimates of local
information diffusion may be induced by the dominant presence of a
company (or industry) in a household’s neighborhood. Taking a drastic
example, suppose there is only one company (or multiple companies all
belonging to the same industry) local to the household. The opportunity
set for local investments is therefore very focused and the inability to
invest locally in any other industry may bias the results. To assess the
impact of industry dominance in the local opportunity set, in unreported
analyses we estimate regressions for local purchases on a subsample of
purchases—household-quarter-industry (h,t,i) combinations for which
the weight of industry i in the portfolio of ﬁrms local to household h does
not exceed the threshold of 50%, that is, the observations not plagued by
the domination of a single company (or industry) in the community. The
regression coefﬁcient remains essentially the same; it declines only very
slightly,from119.3to111.3,whichsuggeststhatthe‘‘one-companytown’’
issue does not drive local information diffusion.
3. Disentangling Information Diffusion Effects
The results presented in Section 2 suggest that the stock purchases made
by households are strongly related to those made by their neighbors,
consistent with word-of-mouth effects playing a strong role in household
investment decisions. However, such a correlation in trading activity
could also reﬂect an underlying similarity in preferences or the industry
composition of local ﬁrms. In regard to U.S. investors, studies have
found correlated trading patterns both for institutional investors [Hong,
Kubik,andStein(2005)]andindividualinvestors[Barber,Odean,andZhu
(2006)].Hong,Kubik,andStein(2005)consideralternativeinterpretations
to their ﬁnding that mutual fund managers engage in word-of-mouth
communication and tilt their portfolios accordingly. They use three sets
of tests to assess the possibility that their results might be driven by inside
information obtained by the money managers directly from company
executives (which they term the ‘‘local-investor-relations’’ activity). First,
their results are unaffected even if all local stocks are excluded from
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their regressions. Second, their results are robust among smaller stocks
(which, on average, have fewer resources at their disposal to pursue
‘‘local-investor-relations’’ activities). Finally, Hong, Kubik, and Stein
(2005) consider the post-Regulation FD period and show that their results
persist in the aftermath of explicit regulation that prohibits companies to
engage in selective dissemination of information, suggesting once again
that ‘‘local-investor-relations’’ strategies do not drive their regression
results.
As Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) point out, none of these ‘‘local-
investor-relations’’ alternative explanations are likely to dominate the
arena of individual investors. In fact, Feng and Seasholes (2004) report
that Chinese individual investors’ correlated investment decisions are
driven by common reaction to locally available news, with no evidence
of word-of-mouth effects on stock trades. However, given the differences
in the fundamental characteristics of the U.S. and Chinese societies (i.e.,
differences in civil liberties such as open and free discussion), it is plausible
that motivations for stock purchases could also be substantially different
across the two cultures.
Moreover, it is important to differentiate among competing sources of
the overall information diffusion effect among U.S. individual investors
because they likely have different levels of inﬂuence on the market. For
example, word-of-mouth effects may create a more dynamic exchange
of information that may lead to a ripple effect of further information
dissemination, which in turn may have an impact on stock prices.
Thus, we devise two alternative strategies to disentangle the sources of
the observed correlation between a household’s stock purchases and those
ofitsneighbors.Theﬁrststrategyconsidersthesociabilityofahousehold’s
state.UsingthecomprehensivestatewidesociabilitymeasurefromPutnam
(2000) (available for all 50 states except Alaska and Hawaii), we assign
a certain level of sociability to every household in our sample, and then
deﬁne a dummy variable associated with each household that labels it as
a household in either a high or a low sociability area. We interact that
dummyvariable with the neighborhoods’industry-level purchases.Within
the United States, there is variation in sociability (i.e., membership in
clubs, trust in other people, etc.) across states. If word-of-mouth is an
importantcontributorto ahousehold’sstockpurchases,thentheobserved
correlationinahousehold’sportfolioallocationandthatoftheirneighbors
should be higher in more social areas. Other explanations for information
diffusioneffects,suchascorrelatedpreferencesandcommonlocalreaction
to news, should not vary with the sociability of the community. We
interpret the coefﬁcients associated with sociability, which represent the
increasedinﬂuenceofneighbors’investmentchoicesonanindividual’sown
portfolio in social areas relative to less social communities, as measures of
the word-of-mouth effects.
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The second strategy considers three key contributions to the overall
information diffusion effect, namely, word-of-mouth communication,
correlated preferences (which may incorporate common local reaction
to news events), and the structure of the local economy. We use the
composition of the neighborhood’s aggregate portfolio to reveal the
neighborhood’s preferences and the accumulation of their reactions to
past news. Analogously, we use the composition of a household’s own
portfolio position to reveal its own preferences and accumulated reactions
to past news. We further use the degree of conformity of the household
portfolio composition to the portfolio composition of the neighborhood
to identify households with preferences and reactions similar to their
neighbors’, as well as those whose preferences and reactions are very
different from their neighbors’. Upon controlling for the composition
of households’ neighborhood portfolios and households’ own portfolio
compositions, as well as the structure of the local economy, we view
the correlation between the household’s stock purchases and those of its
neighbors that survives such rigid controls as a conservative lower bound
on the magnitude of the word-of-mouth effect.
Strikingly, our estimates of the contribution of word-of-mouth
communicationare very similar acrosshouseholdsthat conformedto their
neighbors very closely and those that held very disparate portfolios. This
ﬁnding is reassuring because it suggests that the strategy we employed to
control for the effect of common preferences and the cumulative common
reactions to news did not lead to materially different estimates of the
word-of-mouth effect across the two sets of households.
3.1 Controlling for word-of-mouth effects: the area sociability proxy
In this section we report the results of the analyses in which we identify
a proxy for the word-of-mouth effect and interact that measure with
diffusion coefﬁcients in a regression speciﬁcation very similar to that from
Equation (2). Our proxy for the word-of-mouth effect is the sociability
of the area surrounding a household. To capture sociability, we use
state-level values of the Comprehensive Social Capital Index, as collected
and presented in Putnam (2000).10 We deﬁne a dummy variable that
indicates high and low area sociability levels by classifying households
according to their state’s Comprehensive Social Capital Index (Putnam,
2000) and splitting the households into sociable and non-sociable ones
(the breakpoint is the sociability measure of the median household in
the sample). Further recognizing that sociability effects may be stronger
in the areas with more population, we also develop a speciﬁcation in
10 In some robustness checks we also consider key components of the overall social capital index such
as measures of the time spent visiting friends, number of organizations per capita, number of group
memberships, and trust in people. Results are highly consistent with those based on the speciﬁcations that
employ the Comprehensive Social Capital Index.
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which we interact the diffusion coefﬁcient with both the sociability
dummy and the population measures (as deﬁned in Section 2.4 and
Table 3).
Table 4 presents the results of both analyses across all buys, local buys,
and nonlocal buys (Panels A, B, and C, respectively). Within each panel,
the ﬁrst section reports regression results for speciﬁcations involving area
sociability measures only, whereas the second section reports results of
the more complicated speciﬁcations that also include interactions with
population measures.
Focusing ﬁrst on the speciﬁcations without population interactions,
diffusion effects are considerably stronger among households located in
the more sociable areas. A ten percentage point increase in neighbors’
purchases of stocks from an industry is associated with a 1.5 percentage
point increase in the household’s own purchases of stocks from that
industry in nonsocial areas, while the diffusion effect increases to
2.5 percentage points for households in social states. Thus, the correlation
in household purchases is signiﬁcantly stronger in the states that are
more sociable (i.e., in the states in which individuals are more inclined,
e.g., to be members of clubs and to trust each other). For all buys and
nonlocal buys, the increased inﬂuence of neighbors’ investment choices on
an individual’s own portfolio in more social areas relative to less social
areas (a proxy for the word-of-mouth effect) is 40% (10.0/24.6 and 3.0/9.8,
respectively) of the total information diffusion effect. For local buys, the
‘‘word-of-mouth’’ share of the total correlation between neighborhood
and household purchases is 17% (20.1/119).
Speciﬁcationsthatalsoincorporatepopulationinteractionsyieldsimilar
relative increases across all population groups, with the exception of the
households located in the smallest communities (surrounded by fewer
than 1 million people within a 50-mile radius), for which increased
sociability does not translate into any statistically signiﬁcant changes in
information diffusion. Parallel to the results from Table 3, the correlation
in stock picks increases with the increase of population, and, broadly
speaking, so does the incremental contribution of area sociability (the
coefﬁcients in the bottom row of each of the six analyses reported in
Table 4).
These results suggest that word-of-mouth communication is an
important contributor to information diffusion effects, amounting to
perhaps one to two-ﬁfths of the overall correlation between individual and
community stock purchases.
3.2 Controlling for correlated preferences and structure of local economy
3.2.1 The role of correlated preferences. A potential source of correlated
purchasesamonghouseholdsina geographicareais that thosehouseholds
may have similar preferences. Individual investors might be inﬂuenced
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Table 4
Information diffusion, area sociability, and area population
Population in millions
Fullsample 0–1 1–2.5 2.5–5 5+ R2 # obs.
Panel A: All buys
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles 14.6*** 0.147 2,634,338
(0.4)
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles* 10.0***
Sociability above median (0.3)
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles 5.3*** 9.3*** 22.5*** 42.3*** 0.148 2,634,338
(0.6) (0.8) (1.1) (1.0)
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles* 0.0 3.1*** 7.4*** 9.0***
Sociability above median (0.6) (0.7) (0.6) (0.4)
Panel B: Local buys
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles 98.9*** 0.236 566,735
(1.4)
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles* 20.1***
Sociability above median (0.7)
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles 63.1*** 48.2*** 92.1*** 117.0*** 0.249 566,735
(5.6) (3.2) (2.6) (2.1)
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles* 0.8 20.7*** 13.8*** 16.8***
Sociability above median (4.6) (2.3) (1.4) (0.8)
Panel C: Non-local buys
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles 6.8*** 0.129 2,295,090
(0.4)
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles* 3.0***
Sociability above median (0.3)
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles 4.6*** 6.2*** 6.1*** 8.5*** 0.130 2,295,090
(0.6) (0.9) (1.1) (1.1)
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles* −0.1 0.8 4.8*** 3.7***
Sociability above median (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.5)
This table presents results of stratifying households according to the sociability of the state to which the
household belongs and the size of the population that resides within 50 miles of the household into eight
categories and assessing information diffusion effects in neighborhoods of various sociability and size by
running the following regression (a variant of Equation (2)):
fh,t,i =

βF 50
−h,t,i

∗ Sociability and Population Interactions
+
	
23 
t=1
14 
i=1
γ t,iDt,i


∗ PopulationInteractions+ εh,t,i.
To capture sociability, we use state-level values of the Comprehensive Social Capital Index (available for all
50 states except Alaska and Hawaii), as collected and presented in Putnam (2000). We classify households
according to their state’s Comprehensive Social Capital Index and split the sample of households into sociable
and nonsociable ones, where the breakpoint is the sociability measure of the median household in the sample.
The four population categories are: 0–1 million, 1–2.5 million, 2.5–5 million, and more than 5 million
residents. Regressions are estimated on subsamples selected by the type of purchase and presented in three
panels accordingly (All Buys, Local Buys, and Nonlocal Buys). Panel A presents results based on the sample
of all buys, whereas Panels B and C focus only on local and nonlocal buys, respectively. Each panel presents
results of ﬁtting two speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation only features the sociability measure (without
controls for the local population), whereas the second one is the full speciﬁcation as outlined above. As in
Table 2, Panel B, the coefﬁcient estimates presented for a particular population group represents the overall
information diffusion effect for that group (i.e., the sum of the diffusion effect for the 0–1 million group and
the interaction term for that particular population group). Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for
heteroskedasticity, as well as correlation of error terms at the household-quarter level.
***,**,* denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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by their neighbors’ investment choices because they wish to conform
and keep pace with their neighbors’ wealth and investment habits
[Bernheim (1994), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Shore and White
(2003)]. Moreover, to the extent that individuals choose their place of
residence according to their preferences, and those tend to be correlated
among the residents of the same geographic area, it is possible that
similar tastes might govern investment decisions even without explicit
communicationwith their neighbors.Finally, it is plausiblethat individual
investors’ own preferences are correlated over time; individuals might
have an inclination to conform to some of their previous investment
choices (e.g., favoring stocks from the same industry as they previously
did).
To explore the effect of correlated preferences, we deﬁne two variables
for each (h,t) observation. First, we deﬁne the industry composition
of stock positions of neighboring households (excluding household h
itself) at the end of quarter t − 1. Second, we deﬁne the industry
composition of stock positions of the household itself at the end of
quarter t − 1. The inclusion of these two position-related variables in the
speciﬁcation explicitly accounts for any underlying correlation in trading
activity attributable to a similarity in preferences within a community that
manifestsitselfinasimilarityofstockpurchaseswithinthecommunityora
similarityinanindividual’sownstockpreferencesovertime.Thisapproach
requiresmergingpurchasesinquartert with positionsattheendofquarter
t − 1. Although there is substantial overlap between household identiﬁers
for trades and positions in the database, the matching is imperfect and it
allowed us to retain around two-thirds of the original observations used
in previous analyses.
3.2.2 The structure of the local economy. Companies routinely seek
to generate a certain presence in the local community. One immediate
effect of such endeavors is investors’ enhanced familiarity with local
companies, generated through social interaction with employees and
company efforts such as local advertising and sponsoring local events.
Investors’ propensity to invest in the companies (industries) they are
familiar with, and perhaps even informed about, undoubtedly constitutes
oneimportantfacetofinformationdiffusion.Moreover,thelocalpresence
of a company may enhance the probability of circulation of very
precise, inside information, an issue we addressed to a certain extent
in Section 2.
To capture the impact of the structure of the local economy, we deﬁne
variables that characterize the distribution of the local economy and local
labor force across industries. Speciﬁcally, for each (h,t,i) observation
we deﬁne two variables: the fraction of market value of publicly traded
companies local to household h in quarter t in industry i and the fraction
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of the labor force local to household h in quarter t employed in industry
i.11
Including these two variables should pick up both the effects that stem
from familiarity with local companies and the potential direct company-
stock effect. For example, if there are many employees working for
construction companies in the area, a household’s propensity to invest
in construction ﬁrms could stem from word-of-mouth effects—social
interactionbetweentheseemployeesandotherhouseholds—orfromthose
employees’ propensity to invest in their own company stock (company-
stock effects).
3.2.3 The results. The results of relating the industry composition
of a household’s investments to the neighborhood’s preferences, the
household’s own preferences, and the structure of the local economy
are presented in Table 5. Panel A has three sections, containing estimates
for all buys, local buys, and nonlocal buys, respectively. Within each
section, we ﬁrst show the baseline result, which is aligned very closely with
the corresponding baseline result in Table 2, Panel A.12 The following
row in each section shows the results with the two additional independent
variables that capture preferences for industry allocation. Both variables
are statistically signiﬁcant, which suggests that households’ purchases
acrossindustriesarerelatedtothecommonpreferencesthatprevailintheir
neighborhoods, as well as their own revealed preferences (as described by
theircurrentstockpositions).Forexample,thepointestimatessuggestthat
households entering the quarter with a stock portfolio fully concentrated
in a particular industry allocate 31 to 48 percentage points more of
their quarterly purchases to that same industry. The point estimate of β,
interpretedastheinformationdiffusioneffectunrelatedtosuchpreferences
(i.e.,theword-of-mouthcomponent),isequaltoone-halfofthemagnitude
of the estimated effect of the overall information diffusion for all buys and
nonlocal buys, and to one-third for local buys.
The third row in each section of Panel A includes the variables that
capture the structure of the local economy. Both local-economy variables
are positively related to the allocation of household purchases across
industries and are statistically signiﬁcant, although they tend to attenuate
the estimate of β to a much lesser degree than the two variables related
to preferences. Whereas the effect of the structure of the local economy is
11 Our measure of the industry composition of the local labor force is based on the composition of employees
at publicly traded companies, which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. For the purpose of this analysis
we assume that all the company’s employees are employed in the same county in which the company
headquarters is located. This is a somewhat imprecise measure, but, to our knowledge, more precise panel
data regarding the geographic distribution of the employees for each company are not available.
12 We attribute the small discrepancies between the point estimates (e.g., 19.9 in Table 5 vs. 20.7 in Table 2
for all buys) to the differing numbers of observations, that is, to the different samples employed in the
respective analyses.
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present for all the subsamples, the impact is by far the strongest for local
buys. Speciﬁcally,a 10 percentagepoint changein the presenceof a certain
industry (as measured by ﬁrm values) is associated with a 4.7 percentage
point change in the allocation of a local household’s local purchases
across industries. The impact of the industry-level structure of the local
labor force is also noticeable (1.4 percentage point change), though it is
not as strong. The higher correlations of the local economy variables
with local buys could partially reﬂect company-stock issues, namely, the
propensity to invest in a ﬁrm for which household members work (or
have worked). On the other hand, the signiﬁcant correlations of the local
economy variables with nonlocal buys likely do not reﬂect this concern;
instead,theylikelyreﬂectthenotionthathouseholds’familiaritywithlocal
investment opportunities inﬂuences households’ nonlocal investments as
well.
The fourth row in each section features the results of relating the
industry composition of a household’s investments to both preferences
(the neighborhood’s and the household’s own) and the structure of the
local economy. Estimates of the effects of all the four variables are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Most importantly, the point estimate
of β, interpreted as the information diffusion effect unrelated to either
preferences or the structure of the local economy, approximately equals
one-halfofthemagnitudeoftheestimatedeffectoftheoverallinformation
diffusion for all buys and non-local buys, and one-third for local buys.13
The ﬁnal analysis reported in Panel A of Table 5 seeks to capture
differences among households along unobservable characteristics by
running the baseline regression from Equation (2) with the inclusion
of household-industry-level ﬁxed effects. This is a very rigorous test
because it presents a higher standard than the baseline speciﬁcation: it
relates the change in a household’s allocation of purchases to an industry
from its time series average allocation of purchases to the industry with
the change in its neighborhood’s allocation of purchases to the industry
from the neighborhood’s time series average allocation of purchases to
the industry. For example, an investor who likes technology stocks may
happen to live in an area in which others independently also happen
to invest in technology stocks. Such a noncausal correlation would lead
towardthedetectionofdiffusioneffectsinacross-sectionalregressioneven
if investors acted independently. By contrast, to identify diffusion effects
in a panel regression requires that, in response to a change in community
technology stock investment, the household should change its allocation
to technology stocks in the same direction. Results in the last row of each
13 This is a very robust estimate. Inspection of quarterly estimates (unreported for brevity) suggests that
word-of-mouth communication accounts for 40 to 50% of the overall information diffusion effect (i.e.,
correlation of household stock purchases with that of their neighbors) in the vast majority of quarters,
with a range of 21 to 56%.
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section in Panel A suggest that information diffusion effects remain strong
in the household ﬁxed-effects framework, especially for local buys (3.6 for
all buys; 17.7 for local buys;2.4 for nonlocalbuys), thoughthe magnitudes
are substantially reduced compared to the cross-sectional analyses.
The extent to which households’ portfolios conform to those of
their neighbors can serve as a proxy for identifying households whose
purchasing decisions are driven to varying degrees by the desire to adhere
(inadvertently or not) to the preferences and common news prevailing in
their neighborhood. For example, if a household shared the investment
preferences with its neighborhood and responded to news similarly to the
way its neighborhood did, over time its portfolio composition would be
very similar to that of its community.
We sort households into two types according to the extent to which
theirhouseholdportfolioallocationsat theindustrylevelconformtothose
of their neighbors; the metric we use is the average absolute deviation
in industry portfolio shares between a household and its neighborhood.
Results in Panels B and C of Table 5 suggest that, whereas initially there
are substantial differences in information diffusion effects (i.e., coefﬁcients
associated with the composition of buys of neighboring households)
across the two groups, once the variables that capture preferences and
the structure of the local economy are included in the regression, the
estimated coefﬁcient β (i.e., the relation between a household’s purchases
and its neighbors’ purchases) becomes fairly similar across the two types
of investors. Speciﬁcally, the β for local (nonlocal) buys across the two
groups of investors are 46.2 and 29.4 (3.9 and 2.9), respectively, and are
no longer signiﬁcantly different at the 1% level. This suggests that the two
positions-related variables indeed are successful in capturing the effect of
common preferences because, once they are included in the speciﬁcation,
the remaining information diffusion effect, which we attribute to word-
of-mouth communication, is very comparable across investors who have
stock portfolios very similar to their neighbors and those whose portfolios
are quite different from their neighbors’.
3.3 Unifying the two approaches to information diffusion effect attribution
The previous two sections each approached the task of assessing the
contribution of word-of-mouth effects to the overall correlation between
individual and community stock purchases from a different angle.
Remarkably, the estimates of that contribution qualitatively are in close
agreement: across all speciﬁcations, word-of-mouth effects account for
about one-quarter to one-half of the overall diffusion effect.
In unreported results, we ﬁt a speciﬁcation that unites the two
approaches: coefﬁcients from the full speciﬁcation from the previous
section (including the neighborhoods’ purchases, neighborhoods’ posi-
tions, household positions, structure of local ﬁrms’ market value, and
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structure of the local labor force) are interacted with the dummy
variable capturing neighborhoods’ sociability used in Section 3.1. For
the subsample of all buys, for example, the coefﬁcient associated
with buys of neighboring households from Table 5, 9.0, translates
into 6.1 among households located in less sociable neighborhoods
and 11.2 among households located in more sociable neighbor-
hoods.
There also is a stark contrast between the impact of area sociability on
the coefﬁcients associated with the structure of local ﬁrm market value
(as deﬁned by the share of market capitalization of local ﬁrms across the
14 industries) and those associated with the structure of the local labor
force (as deﬁned by the share of employees across the 14 industries in the
area). Whereas high area sociability reducesthe importance of the share of
local ﬁrm market value in a particular industry on household investment
choice, it increases the inﬂuence of the fraction of local employees in a
particular industry. Among households in less sociable states, the fraction
of local ﬁrm market value in a particular industry is a more important
predictor of the fraction of a household’s stock purchases in that same
industry than the local employee share is. However, among households
in more sociable states, the fraction of local ﬁrm market value in a
particular industry is uncorrelated with the fraction of a household’s
stock purchases in that same industry, whereas the industry-composition
of local workers has increased importance over household stock picks.
These ﬁndings further suggest that the state-level measure of sociability
we employ is useful in isolating the word-of-mouth effect on investment
decisions.
3.4 Do lagged purchases in one neighborhood predict purchases in another
neighborhood?
In our ﬁnal analysis, we explore whether lagged purchases in one
neighborhood predict the purchases in another neighborhood. Up to
this point, we focused primarily on relating household investment
decisions to those made by their immediate neighbors. Figure 1 shows
that purchases made by a household are related not only to those
made in the immediate community but also, to some extent, to those
made in more distant communities. However, as one might suspect,
and as is conﬁrmed in Figure 1, a household’s purchases of nonlocal
stocks are more sensitive to the decisions made by members of more
distant communities than its purchases of local stocks are. That is, going
beyond the 50-mile community leads to a substantially faster decline
in information diffusion effects in the domain of local stocks than in
the domain of nonlocal stocks. Simply put, households are relatively
less likely to be inﬂuenced by nonlocals when making their local stock
picks.
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Table 5
Information diffusion, correlated preferences for industry allocation, and structure of local economy
Composition of
Buys of HHs Positions of HHs Positions of Firms Workers
Buys ≤ 50 miles ≤ 50 miles this HH ≤ 50 miles ≤ 50 miles R2 # obs.
Panel A: All households
All 19.9*** 0.134 1,786,666
(0.4)
All 9.8*** 16.5*** 32.5*** 0.204 1,786,666
(0.4) (0.5) (0.2)
All 17.4*** 4.8*** 4.0*** 0.135 1,786,666
(0.4) (0.3) (0.3)
All 9.0*** 14.5*** 32.4*** 1.9*** 2.7*** 0.204 1,786,666
(0.4) (0.6) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
All (HH-industry 3.6*** 0.323 1,786,666
ﬁxed effects) (0.5)
Local 128.9*** 0.249 265,509
(1.7)
Local 43.6*** 58.8*** 47.5*** 0.417 265,509
(1.7) (2.3) (0.5)
Local 85.1*** 46.9*** 14.2*** 0.276 265,509
(1.8) (1.4) (1.3)
Local 36.8*** 40.1*** 46.2*** 18.1*** 5.6*** 0.421 265,509
(1.7) (2.4) (0.5) (1.2) (1.1)
Local (HH-industry 17.7*** 0.577 265,509
ﬁxed effects) (2.5)
Nonlocal 7.4*** 0.121 1,510,390
(0.4)
Nonlocal 3.7*** 7.2*** 31.2*** 0.186 1,510,390
(0.4) (0.6) (0.2)
Nonlocal 7.0*** 0.7*** 1.0*** 0.121 1,510,390
(0.4) (0.3) (0.3)
Nonlocal 3.6*** 7.0*** 31.2*** −0.1 0.8*** 0.186 1,510,390
(0.4) (0.6) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
Nonlocal 2.4*** 0.305 1,510,390
(HH-industry
ﬁxed effects)
(0.5)
Panel B: Similar HH Portfolios (Average Absolute Deviation in Industry Positions
from HHs within 50 miles is in Bottom Quartile)
All 30.0*** 0.205 446,670
(0.8)
All 10.3*** 17.5*** 35.9*** 0.245 446,670
(0.8) (1.3) (0.5)
All 9.5*** 15.5*** 35.7*** 2.1*** 2.0*** 0.245 446,670
(0.8) (1.3) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6)
Local 148.6*** 0.543 66,390
(4.2)
Local+ 53.7*** 66.8*** 40.1*** 0.586 66,390
(4.8) (6.4) (1.7)
Local+ 46.2*** 53.3*** 39.2*** 1.6 16.6*** 0.587 66,390
(4.8) (6.9) (1.7) (3.3) (2.8)
Nonlocal 14.9*** 0.173 377,608
(0.8)
Nonlocal+ 3.9*** 9.2*** 33.6*** 0.207 377,608
(0.8) (1.3) (0.5)
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Table 5
(continued)
Composition of
Buys of HHs Positions of HHs Positions of Firms Workers
Buys ≤ 50 miles ≤ 50 miles this HH ≤ 50 miles ≤ 50 miles R2 # obs.
Nonlocal+ 3.9*** 9.1*** 33.6*** 0.3 0.0 0.207 377,608
(0.8) (1.3) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6)
Panel C: Disparate HH Portfolios (Average Absolute Deviation in Industry Positions
from HHs within 50 miles is in Top Quartile)
All 4.5*** 0.067 446,670
(0.7)
All 6.4*** 7.2*** 27.8*** 0.143 446,670
(0.7) (0.9) (0.3)
All 5.7*** 5.7*** 27.8*** 2.2*** 2.0*** 0.143 446,670
(0.7) (0.9) (0.3) (0.5) (0.5)
Local 60.6*** 0.064 66,390
(3.2)
Local+ 40.6*** 52.4*** 45.7*** 0.265 66,390
(3.1) (4.1) (0.7)
Local+ 29.4*** 29.1*** 43.9*** 30.0*** 3.4 0.275 66,390
(3.0) (4.0) (0.8) (2.2) (2.3)
Nonlocal 0.1 0.063 377,608
(0.7)
Nonlocal+ 3.1*** 2.3*** 27.1*** 0.135 377,608
(0.7) (0.9) (0.3)
Nonlocal+ 2.9*** 2.0** 27.1*** 0.1 0.8 0.135 377,608
(0.7) (0.9) (0.3) (0.5) (0.6)
This table presents results of assessing the contribution of word-of-mouth effects to the overall information
diffusion effect (i.e., correlation of household stock purchases with those made by of their neighbors).
Accordingly, we regress households’ industry-level purchases on neighbors’ purchases, variables capturing
correlated preferences for industry allocation, variables capturing the structure of the local economy, and
322 industry-time dummy variables (a variant of Equation (2)). Two variables for each (h,t) observation
are used to capture correlated preferences. First, we deﬁne the industry composition of stock positions of
neighboring households (excluding household h itself) at the end of quarter t − 1. Second, we deﬁne the
industry composition of stock positions of the household itself at the end of quarter t − 1. To capture the
impact of the structure of the local economy, for each (h,t,i) observation we deﬁne two variables: the fraction
of market value of companies local to household h in quarter t in industry i and the fraction of the labor force
local to household h in quarter t employed in industry i. In this framework, estimates of β are conservative
lower bounds on the contribution of word-of-mouth effects to the overall information diffusion effect. Panel
A has three sections, containing estimates for all buys, local buys, and nonlocal buys, respectively. Within
each section, we ﬁrst show the baseline result (i.e., Equation (2)). The following row in each section shows the
results with the two additional independent variables that seek to capture preferences for industry allocation.
The third row in each section of Panel A includes the variables that capture the structure of the local economy.
The fourth row in each section features the results of relating the industry composition of a household’s
investments to both preferences (the neighborhood’s and own) and the structure of the local economy.
The ﬁnal analysis, reported in the ﬁfth row in each section, seeks to capture differences among households
along unobservable characteristics by running the baseline regression from Equation (2) with the inclusion
of household-industry-level ﬁxed effects. Panels B and C show results of replicating the key analyses from
Panel A on two subsamples of households. Speciﬁcally, we sort households into two types according to the
extent to which their household portfolio allocations at the industry level conform to those of their neighbors;
the metric we use is the average absolute deviation in industry portfolio shares between a household and its
neighborhood. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for heteroskedasticity, as well as correlation of
error terms at the household-quarter level.
***,**,* denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
+ denotes that the difference in coefﬁcients across the similar and disparate samples is not signiﬁcant at the
one percent level.
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Thus, a natural place to look for dissemination of information across
communitiesisin a household’spurchaseof nonlocalstocks.Inparticular,
do the ﬁnancial decisions of nearby households have less of an effect
over time, whereas the decisions made by more distant households have
increasing inﬂuence over time? To examine this issue, we use the same
150-mile area surrounding a given household we employed to produce the
results in Figure 1. We relate the composition of a household’s quarterly
purchases of nonlocal stocks across industries to the contemporaneous
purchases and prior purchases (with a one-quarter and two-quarter lag)
made by the households in the immediate 50-mile neighborhood as well
as those located 50–150 miles away (for simplicity, we divide these more
distant households into two rings of equal area around the immediate
50-mile community).
Figure 2 illustrates information diffusion effects across distance from
the household and time since purchase. Whereas the effects of the
immediate 50-mile community and the households contained in the ﬁrst
ring surrounding the immediate community decline monotonically over
time, the inﬂuence of the purchases made by the households contained in
the second ring (the area farthest from the household) actually increase
over time. In other words, whereas the contemporaneous purchases made
by a household’s closest neighbors have a larger impact on one’s own
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Around the
Community
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Figure 2
Informationdiffusion effectsassociatedwithinvestments in nonlocal stocks thosemadeby timeandspace.
1354Information Diffusion Effects in Individual Investors’ Common Stock Purchases
purchases than the decisions made by those neighbors one or two quarters
ago,thereverseistruefortheeffectofmoredistanthouseholds’investment
choices on a given household—the purchases made by the more distant
households one and two quarters ago have a larger effect on a given
household’s purchases this quarter than those made by the households
from distant communities contemporaneously. Indeed, our unreported
tests suggest that the difference over time in the information diffusion
effects of both the immediate 50-mile community and the ﬁrst ring are
statistically different from those of the more distant second ring.14
To be clear, a household’s immediate neighbors always have a bigger
inﬂuence on its purchases than distant neighbors do (whether measured
contemporaneously, with a one-quarter lag, or with a two-quarter lag).
However,thepatternofinformationdiffusioneffectsacrosstimeandspace
is broadly consistent with a gradual dissemination of information from
one community to another.
The Figure illustrates information diffusion effects by distance from the
householdandtimesincepurchase.Theregressionspeciﬁcationunderlying
the Figure is similar to Equation (2). However, instead of focusing only on
contemporaneous purchases made by other households within 50 miles,
we now relate the composition of a given household’s purchases not
only to those made by other households within 50 miles but also to
those located 50–150 miles away (for simplicity, divided into two rings
of equal area around the immediate 50-mile community). The regression
speciﬁcation allows purchases made by surrounding communities to affect
a given household’s purchase of nonlocal stocks contemporaneously, with
a one-quarter lag, and with a two-quarter lag.
14 The regression speciﬁcation underlying the results displayed in Figure 2 is similar to Equation (2).
However, instead of focusing only on contemporaneous purchases made by other households within 50
miles, we now relate the composition of a given household’s purchases not only to those made by other
households within 50 miles but also to those located 50–150 miles away (for simplicity, divided into
two rings of equal area around the immediate 50-mile community). The regression speciﬁcation allows
purchases made by surrounding communities to affect a given household’s purchase of nonlocal stocks
contemporaneously, with a one-quarter lag, and with a two-quarter lag:
fh,t,i = β50,Contemporaneous F50
−h,t,i + β50, 1−quarter lag F50
−h,t−1,i + β50, 2−quarter lag F50
−h,t−2,i
+β1st Ring,Contemporaneous F
1st Ring
−h,t,i + β1st Ring,1−quarter lag F
1st Ring
−h,t−1,i
+β1st Ring,2−quarter lag F
1st Ring
−h,t−2,i + β2nd Ring,Contemporaneous F
2nd Ring
−h,t,i
+β2nd Ring,1−quarter lag F
2nd Ring
−h,t−1,i + β2nd Ring,2−quarter lag F
2nd Ring
−h,t−2,i
+
23 
t=1
14 
i=1
γt,iDt,i+ εh,t,i. (3)
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4. Conclusion
We focus on the relation between the investment choices made by an
individual investor’s neighborhood (households located within 50 miles
from the investor) and the investor’s own investment choices. Using a
detailed set of common-stock investments that nearly 36,000 households
made in the period from 1991 to 1996, we ﬁnd strong evidence of
information diffusion: baseline estimates suggest that a ten percentage-
point increase in purchases of stocks from an industry made by a
household’s neighbors is associated with a two percentage point increase
in the household’s own purchases of stocks from that industry, with the
effect larger for local stock purchases.
The ﬁndings are robust to controls for inside information effects,
domination of a single company (industry) in the neighborhood, and
household ﬁxed effects. In sum, there is strong evidence that individuals’
stock purchase decisions are related to those made by their neighbors. The
strength of the information diffusion effect is considerable; for example,
investors in more populous areas, where, on average, there are many more
local investment choices, still are very concentrated in their purchases. To
the extent that their investment choices are related to their neighbors’,
the information diffusion effect is likely at least partially responsible for
individual investors’ lack of diversiﬁcation.
Putting our results in perspective and comparing them with the ﬁndings
from Feng and Seasholes (2004) delivers a new, richer understanding of
the different mechanisms that govern individuals’ investment decisions
across various societies. Whereas Feng and Seasholes (2004) report
that individual investors’ correlated investment decisions are driven
by common reaction to locally available news, with no evidence of
word-of-mouth effects among Chinese investors, our estimates suggest
that word-of-mouth effects among U.S. individual investors are strong,
particularly in the more social areas. This discrepancy likely reﬂects
differences in civil liberties and in the extent of presence of open and
free discussion across the two societies. Exploring the role of societal
characteristics in portfolio decisions appears to be a fruitful area for
further research.
Ourresults,in conjunctionwith thoseofHong,Kubik,andStein(2005),
suggest that word-of-mouth effects are a broad phenomenon that affects
ﬁnancial decisions made by both mutual fund managers and individual
investors. Because word-of-mouth effects may create a dynamic exchange
of information that could lead to a ripple effect of further information
dissemination, which in turn may have an impact on stock prices, under-
standing the interplay between individual and institutional trading across
time and space might yield insights into price dynamics in the stock
market.
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